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C'hapter Nine 
Unilateral Trade-Based Measures for 
Protection of the Marine Environment 
A Legal and Policy Perspective 
David A. Wirth and Douglas J. Caldwell 
It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the 
difficulties and disagreements, of which history is full, are mainly due to 
a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions without 
first discovering precisely what question is it which you desire to answer. 
-George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica 
Apparently fortuitously, the subject of this volume neatly coincides with a ma-
jor legal and policy debate that has been raging for about a decade over the 
appropriate relationship between the competing policies of liberalized trade 
and environmental protection. On closer inspection, it is no accident that the 
colloquy over the appropriate relationship between trade and environment has 
focused on marine conservation issues, nor is it unusual that a study of marine 
environmental ethics should include a contribution on the seemingly unrelated 
issue of trade. 
Portions of this chapter are based on the authors' previously published work, including in par-
ticular their joint article, "Trade and the Environment: Equilibrium or Imbalance?" 17 Mich. 
]. Int'/ L. 563 (1996), and on Caldwell's unpublished manuscript, "Unilateralism in the Trade 
and Environment Context: Invoking Unilateral Trade Measures to Protect the International 
Environment:' prepared for an April 1996 meeting of the Joint Policy Dialogue on Environ-
ment and Trade, while both authors were working in the Trade, Health, and Environment 
Program of the Community Nutrition Institute in Washington, D.C. 
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Ever since the principle of freedom of the seas began to be accepted in in-
ternational practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states have at-
tempted to devise ways to exert their influence over the significant portion of 
the planet's watery surface that, as a formal legal matter, lies beyond their-
or any state's-jurisdiction. During the twentieth century, rising concern for 
conservation of the marine environment led to greater policy pressure on states 
to cooperate to overcome collective action problems by devising multilateral 
schemes for managing the resources of the marine commons. But what hap-
pens when agreement on common management approaches is lacking or in-
adequate? Under such circumstances, states may very well proceed by taking 
unilateral action. 
This chapter examines a subset of unilateral actions designed to protect ma-
rine resources outside a state's jurisdiction-those that restrict trade, partic-
ularly imports. This category of governmental actions has sparked particular 
controversy because of its significant potential to run afoul of legal rules gov-
erning international trade. So, in taking unilateral action to protect marine re-
sources such as endangered sea turtles or dolphins, a state such as the United 
States may very well find itself facing allegations that it has violated foreign 
states' legal rights to access our markets. 
So far, this question has been analyzed primarily from a legal point of view. 
Of necessity, such an approach asks and answers the question, "Has there been 
an infringement of a legal right?" Even to nonlawyers, a legal analysis offers 
some superficial appeal because it deals in relatively crisp questions, usually 
phrased in yes-no or on-off terms: "Is there a legal right, or isn't tht'.re?" "Has 
the right been violated, or hasn't it?" "Is there or isn't there an obligation?" "Has 
the obligation been adequately performed, or hasn't it?" 
Unfortunately, by concealing the dynamic interactions between such appar-
ently mutually exclusive opposites as unilateralism and multilateralism, such a 
bipolar approach can also be confining. As a vehicle for reconciling competing 
policy considerations with impacts on the collectively shared environment, an 
approach that attempts to identify the incontestable prerogatives of the holders 
oflegal rights and the irrefutable duties of those owing obligations to the hold-
ers of such rights may be considerably less than satisfactory. Accordingly, after 
describing several settings in which the United States has employed unilateral 
measures, this chapter describes the legal context in which the argument over 
unilateral trade-based measures has taken place. After identifying some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of unilateral trade-based measures from a more 
open-textured perspective, the interaction between unilateral and consensus-
based approaches is examined and analyzed. Finally, the chapter proposes a 
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different way oflooking at the problem, based on a test of sustainability of trade 
that affects marine environmental resources. 
The Problem of Unilateral Measures 
Virtually since the inception of a legal system governing relations among states, 
international law has addressed marine resources. Every international lawyer 
knows the name of Grotius, often described as the father of international law, 
among whose principal contributions to the discipline was vigorous advocacy 
for the freedom of the seas. 1 Inherent in the notion of the high seas is the exis-
tence of an area beyond the national jurisdiction of any state. In environmental 
terms, such areas, of which the high seas is the best-known example, are often 
described as a global commons. Although recent instruments, most notably the 
1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2 have permitted greater 
intrusion of coastal state jurisdiction into the high seas, the oceans, including 
those portions subject to national jurisdiction, generally are the subject of a 
well-defined international legal regime. 
The difficulties described in this chapter, as in this volume more generally, 
arise from the physical reality that to be effectively conserved, many marine re-
sources of necessity require common management schemes. The international 
law of the sea, framed as it is in terms of states' rights and obligations, poorly re-
flects the need for collective action to conserve ocean-related values and ameni-
ties, including in particular marine biological resources. That is perhaps to be 
expected, as the oceans are the subject of many competing demands from both 
states and nonstate actors: commerce, navigation, recreation, national security, 
food supply, and extractive mineral exploitation, to name a few. 
In their day-to-day interactions, states have evolved a number of mecha-
nisms to overcome collective action problems, including the common manage-
ment of shared or common resources. One approach is the accretion of custom, 
which in international law arises from a pattern of practice by states motivated 
by a sense of legal obligation ( opinio juris). This, indeed, is the mechanism by 
which the freedom of the seas promoted by Grotius became a binding legal 
norm in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But the time necessary for 
the accumulation of a consistent record of behavior may be lengthy, systematic 
patterns of state practice may be unclear or uncertain, and there may be ques-
tions about the sense oflegal obligation giving rise to a general practice, any one 
of which may delay or impede the crystallization of a customary legal principle. 
The content of many customary legal norms, moreover, is imprecise, and their 
application in concrete situations, particularly those in cases of disagreement, 
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may consequently be difficult. A good example of this phenomenon is contin-
ued discussion of the existence and content of a generally applicable "precau-
tionary principle," a precept counseling the need for policy action in cases of 
scientific uncertainty, as a customary norm of international law. 
For these reasons, international agreements or treaties, perhaps more fa-
miliar to the average person as the analogue in international law of a contract 
among states, have been the preferred vehicle for crafting international norms 
concerning the environment. Treaties nonetheless present their own impedi-
ments to efficacious management of shared or common resources. Treaty ne-
gotiations may also be lengthy, as in the case of the Montego Bay Convention, or 
ultimately inconclusive. In any event, treaties by definition apply only to those 
states that indicate their affirmative intent to be bound by the compact's obli-
gations, a system that often rewards free riders or laggards. In contrast to law-
making techniques in many municipal legal systems, the texts of multilateral 
treaties are ordinarily adopted by "consensus," meaning unanimity. Even after 
acquiescing in the agreement's adoption, any state may decline to be bound by 
most multilateral agreements merely by withholding approval in a subsequent 
domestic ratification process. Many multilateral agreements contain trigger re-
quirements, ordinarily framed in terms of a minimum number of ratifications, 
as a condition precedent to their effectiveness even for those states that have 
accepted the obligations in the instrument. International treaty-making char-
acterized by these multiple junctures at which the consent of states is neces-
sary can produce disappointingly diluted, "least common denominator" obli-
gations determined by the more reluctant participants rather than the more 
ambitious ones. 
In response to these barriers to effective solutions to collective action prob-
lems involving the management of resources of the commons, certain con-
stituencies have advocated, and some states have adopted, unilateral approaches 
as alternatives to create incentives for more effective international cooperation. 
Although the specifics vary, unilateral measures of the sort addressed in this 
chapter attempt to identify a juncture at which the application of governmental 
policy by one state changes the incentive structure in such a way as to encourage 
related policy action by another. 
The Japan Whaling Case 
An excellent example is provided by the Japan Whaling 3 case in the U.S. Su-
preme Court. This dispute arose against the background of the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Whaling Convention), a multilat-
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eral agreement concluded soon after the end of World War II that today serves 
as the principal international vehicle for the protection and conservation of 
endangered whale stocks. A major means by which the Whaling Convention 
achieves these aims is the adoption of harvest quotas by the International Whal-
ing Commission (1wc), representing all the parties to the convention. Quotas, 
which may be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote, are binding on all par-
ties to the convention. Parties may unilaterally opt out of particular quotas by 
filing timely objections, thereby relieving themselves of the legal obligation to 
comply. 
To reinforce the Whaling Convention, which has no provisions for sanc-
tions for quota violations, Congress adopted two statutory enactments: the 
Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 and the Packwood 
Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The 
Pelly and Packwood Amendments attempt to buttress the Whaling Conven-
tion's vigor on the domestic level by requiring the secretary of commerce to 
monitor the whaling activities of foreign nationals and to investigate poten-
tial violations of the Whaling Convention. On completion of an investigation, 
the secretary must promptly decide whether to certify conduct by foreign na-
tionals that undermines the Whaling Convention. The Pelly Amendment di-
rects the secretary of commerce to certify to the president if "nationals of a 
foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a 
manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an inter-
national fishery conservation program." 4 After certification by the secretary of 
commerce, the president may-but does not have to-direct the secretary of 
the treasury to prohibit the importation of fish products from the offending 
country. The Packwood Amendment, designed to reflect Congress's impatience 
with the president's failure to impose sanctions authorized but not required by 
the Pelly Amendment, removes the element of discretion at the sanction stage 
and mandates a reduction of at least 50 percent in a certified nation's fishery 
allocation within the U.S. fishery conservation zone. 5 
In 1981, the rwc established a zero quota for harvests of sperm whales. Dur-
ing the next year, the commission ordered a five-year moratorium on commer-
cial whaling to begin in the 1985-1986 season and to continue until 1990. Japan 
filed timely objections that effectively relieved it, as an international legal mat-
ter, from compliance with the sperm whale quotas for 1982-1984. Nevertheless, 
the potential U.S. sanction under the Pelly and Packwood Amendments threat-
ened Japanese whaling for the 1984-1985 season. After extensive negotiations, 
the United States and Japan concluded an agreement in which Japan agreed 
to catch no more than four hundred sperm whales in each of the 1984 and 1985 
152 Wirth and Caldwell 
seasons. Japan also agreed to cease commercial whaling by 1988, three years after 
the date specified by the 1wc. In return, the United States agreed not to certify 
Japan under the Pelly and Packwood Amendments. A conservation organiza-
tion, apparently believing the promises obtained from Japan in the bilateral 
agreement to be insufficient to protect sperm whale populations, challenged 
the secretary of commerce's failure to certify Japan, notwithstanding the U.S. 
agreement with that country. The dispute in the Supreme Court concerned the 
appropriate interpretation of the Pelly and Packwood Amendments in light of 
the agreement with Japan, with the Supreme Court holding that agreement to 
be consistent with the statute. 
Much of the occasionally acrimonious debate over the relationship between 
trade and the environment can be seen as a generalization of the dynamics en-
countered a decade and a half ago in the Japan Whaling case. Perceived deficien-
cies in the vitality of multilateral commitments to conservation policies have 
encouraged some constituencies to advocate and some states to adopt unilat-
eral measures, much as in Japan Whaling. And a relatively obvious juncture at 
which to apply unilateral approaches is trade, an approach recognized in the 
Pelly Amendment itself. 
The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute 
The celebrated tuna-dolphin dispute presents the general case in microcosm. 
This controversy concerns tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, 
where schools of tuna often travel below pods of dolphin. Dolphin swim in the 
upper levels of the ocean, where they serve as a visible indicator of the presence 
of tuna below. Fishing boats employing the practice of "setting on dolphin" 
encircle the dolphin with a purse seine to capture the tuna below. Setting on 
dolphin can result in widespread injury and death to air-breathing dolphins 
who become entangled in the nets. When dolphin and tuna together have been 
surrounded by purse seines, it is possible to reduce or eliminate the catch of 
dolphin by using certain procedures that minimize injury and mortality. 
Assuring that "the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of marine mam-
mals permitted in the course of commercial fishing operations be reduced to 
insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate" is a 
principal purpose of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, enacted in 1972. 6 The 
statute creates a regulatory program that establishes industrywide practices for 
tuna harvesting designed to prevent the incidental taking of marine mammals, 
specifically various species of dolphins. The U.S. fleet generally complies with 
these requirements. Foreign fleets not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, primarily 
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those of Mexico and Venezuela, in the past have had considerably higher dol-
phin mortality rates. To address this problem, the MMPA has provisions that 
require the Department of the Treasury, in which the Customs Service is lo-
cated, to "ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which 
have been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the in-
cidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United 
States standards." 
As a result of executive branch inaction with respect to foreign tuna caught 
with technologies that harm dolphins, Congress twice amended the MMPA to 
clarify the nondiscretionary nature of the mandate and to establish a deadline 
for implementation. By 1990, the secretary of commerce had neither issued find-
ings of comparability nor banned tuna imports from the offending nations. 
Frustrated with this delay, the Earth Island Institute and the Marine Mammal 
Fund, private environmental organizations with a particular interest in marine 
mammal preservation, brought suit and obtained a court order enjoining exec-
utive branch officials from permitting further imports of yellowfin tuna caught 
with purse seines because no findings of comparability had been made. 7 This 
action affected tuna imports from Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Panama, and 
Ecuador. 
Mexico then initiated a dispute settlement process under the auspices of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GA TT), 8 then the principal mul-
tilateral instrument governing international trade relations among states. Af-
ter considering Mexico's complaint, a three-member GATT dispute settlement 
panel concluded that the U.S. embargo violated Mexico's trading rights. 9 Pre-
sumably because negotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement 
were occurring simultaneously, Mexico did not present the panel report to the 
GATT Council, representing all the contracting parties to that instrument, for 
adoption. A second complaint initiated by the European Community and the 
Netherlands, challenging the secondary ban, intended to prevent "tuna laun-
dering," which had a similar result, 10 likewise remained unadopted by council 
when GATT ceased to exist at the end of 1994. 
The World Trade Organization (wTo), the successor to GATT, has now had 
occasion to consider a similar complaint initiated by Thailand, Malaysia, Pak-
istan, and India concerning an import prohibition on shrimp harvested with 
methods that harm endangered sea turtles. The wTo's new Appellate Body up-
held the dispute settlement panel's conclusion that the shrimp ban, like the 
tuna embargo, violated the trading rights of the complainants and the obliga-
tions of the United States. 11 In contrast to both tuna panels and the wTo panel 
that initially heard the case, 12 the Appellate Body strongly suggested that the 
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deficiencies in the U.S. scheme were not inherent in the "extraterritorial" reach 
of the import ban but instead could be corrected through a more careful design 
and implementation of the program. 13 
Legal Approaches to Unilateral Trade-Based Measures 
A good portion of the existing literature examining unilateral requirements for 
protecting the marine environment relies on legal or quasi-legalistic method-
ologies. Among those, the greatest attention has been paid to trade-based uni-
lateral measures that may offend the obligations found in agreements adopted 
under the auspices of the WTO or its predecessor, GATT ( collectively referred to 
as GATT!WTO rules). 
Most situations governed by international law can be analyzed in terms of 
rights and obligations on the part of states, the principal "subjects" to which 
international law applies. As discussed earlier, rights and obligations in inter-
national law originate from the two primary and analytically distinct channels 
of treaty and custom. Of the two, treaties have been by far the predominant, 
if not the exclusive, avenue for defining international expectations in the area 
of international trade. International trade agreements, which are very much 
the analogue of contracts in domestic legal systems, typically memorialize joint 
undertakings or negotiated bargains that create rights and corresponding obli-
gations. 
Accordingly, each of the situations described in the previous section can 
be assessed by identifying the international rights and obligations, if any, at 
stake. In the case of Japan and the sperm whales, one might ask first whether 
the United States has the authority under international law to take the actions 
contemplated by the statutory enactments at issue in the Japan Whaling case. 
The Packwood Amendment anticipates a reduction in the offending nation's 
fishing allocation in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Part V of the 
1982 Montego Bay Convention 14 provides for an EEZ of up to two hundred 
miles in width in which a coastal state has sole jurisdiction over the living re-
sources found in the water column. Although not a party to the convention, 
the United States has accepted the bulk of this instrument as a codification 
of customary international law and consequently claimed an EEZ of two hun-
dred miles. 15 A state such as Japan, which itself has declared a two-hundred-
mile EEZ, would be unlikely to challenge the U.S. assertion of jurisdiction over 
this area. 
Consequently, although not entirely free from the potential for dispute, one 
might conclude with some confidence as a legal matter that the United States 
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has the authority under international law to reduce Japan's fishing quota in 
the U.S. EEZ and that by doing so the United States would infringe neither any 
rights of Japan under international law nor any legal obligations owed by the 
United States to Japan. But having promised in a binding bilateral agreement 
to refrain from certifying Japan and from reducing Japan's fishing allocation as 
long as Japan complied with the terms of the subsequent bilateral agreement, 
the United States by nonetheless taking those actions would quite likely have 
violated an obligation owed to Japan that originated in that bilateral agree-
ment. Not coincidentally, this was the dilemma presented to the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the Japan Whaling case: had the result been other than that reached by 
the Court, the Court's action quite likely would have compelled the executive 
branch to violate Japan's rights under international law. 
Current WTo Law 
Situations in which the national action under consideration restricts trade, such 
as the Pelly Amendment identified in the Japan Whaling case and, more con-
cretely, the embargoes on tuna and shrimp in the GATT and wTo disputes, have 
attracted more attention precisely because they present a greater potential for 
conflict between U.S. obligations and other states' rights under international 
trade agreements. The rights created by reciprocal trade agreements typically 
concern market access, and the duties of states under those agreements are 
framed in terms of constraints on the capacity of national governments to im-
pede other states' market access. More particularly, GATT/WTO rules preclude 
discrimination among imported products on the basis of their national ori-
gin (the most-favored-nation principle), forbid discrimination between for-
eign and domestic products ( the principle of national treatment), and prohibit 
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports. 
Using these constructs of rights and obligations emanating from trade agree-
ments, the GA TT dispute settlement panel in the first tuna case determined that 
tuna caught in ways that kill dolphin and those that do not are "like" products 
for the purposes of the international trade regime. This is a crucial juncture in 
the analysis, for it means that the country of export-Mexico, in this case-
consequently enjoys the rights of nondiscrimination articulated in GATT/WTO 
rules. In reaching this conclusion, the panel distinguished the tuna exported 
from Mexico from a product that is impure or unhealthful by virtue of mercury 
contamination, for example. Adulterated food would not be a like product and 
would not receive the benefits of nondiscriminatory treatment that must be 
accorded pure tuna, and the United States would be within its rights and would 
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violate no duty owed to Mexico by prohibiting importation of such tainted 
foodstuffs. 
In this regard, two attributes of the international trade regime deserve par-
ticular note. The first is that the obligations of the state of import ( the United 
States, in this case) are framed in negative terms; the rights of the state of export 
(in this case, Mexico) are given life when the state of import refrains from tak-
ing action-prohibiting importation of foreign products within its borders-
that otherwise would clearly be permissible as an inherent attribute of its sover-
eignty. Second, the panel's conclusion with respect to the issue oflike product 
necessarily means that states of import may not discriminate among products 
based on manufacturing process (so-called processes or production method-
ologies [PPMs ]), as distinct from product content or characteristics, even when 
a production methodology creates environmental externalities. 
The other essential fulcrum in a legal analysis of the tuna and shrimp im-
port bans concerns the application of exceptions in GATT that are designed to 
immunize measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" 
and regulatory actions "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption." 16 These exemptions might be thought 
of as "escape hatches" or "safe havens" that authorize states to take certain mea-
sures even if they are otherwise inconsistent with the agreement. Here, the three 
panels-the GATT panels in the two tuna disputes and the initial panel hearing 
the turtle-shrimp case-diverged in analytical approach, although not in re-
sult. The result in the first report turned in great measure on the location of 
the resource to be protected-dolphins-outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
the state taking the measure. The outcome in the second tuna case addressing 
the secondary embargo emphasized the impermissible use of trade measures to 
leverage the environmental policies of another GA TT party. The holding of the 
turtle-shrimp panel stressed "threat[s] to the multilateral trading system" as an 
operative test for distinguishing between measures permitted by or inconsistent 
with GATT. 
The Appellate Body's report in the turtle-shrimp dispute, the first time that 
entity had considered the generic question, in effect corrected overreaching by 
not one but all three panels. Basing its decision on a different passage pro-
hibiting "unjustifiable" or "arbitrary" discrimination, the Appellate Body em-
phasized the application of the measure in the dispute at hand, thereby mini-
mizing any implication that the structure of the U.S. program was inherently 
flawed. In other words, the basis for the Appellate Body's holding was suffi-
ciently narrow to leave some prospects for states to employ measures similar 
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to those challenged in this case as long as those requirements are appropriately 
applied. Significantly, the Appellate Body also underscored the desirability or, 
indeed, necessity of good-faith exploration of consensual approaches to com-
mon resource management, presumably as memorialized in an international 
agreement, before states resort to unilateral measures of the sort challenged in 
this dispute. 17 
As a result, the only meaningful legal debate concerns the unilateral use of 
trade measures applied at the border to protect the environment outside the 
jurisdiction of the state taking the unilateral action. Unilateral measures applied 
at a state's borders are to be distinguished legally from extraterritorial regulation 
that seeks to prescribe or proscribe behavior outside a state's jurisdiction. It is 
well established in international law that each state has the sovereign right to 
restrict the entry into its territory of products and substances. Access to other 
states' markets is not a sovereign prerogative of states. This explains in large 
measure why many states utilize agreements, such as those contained in the 
GATT/wTo regime, to delineate their respective rights and obligations toward 
one another in the area of international trade. 
As this discussion demonstrates, a legal analysis of the appropriateness of 
deploying unilateral measures to protect marine resources relies heavily on the 
notions of rights and obligations of states. Particularly as employed in trade 
agreements, rights are equated with unimpeded market access, and the cor-
responding obligations constrain the exercise of the discretion of the state of 
import in attenuating those rights. The Appellate Body's emphasis on the ob-
jective rationality of the measure employed somewhat modulates this stark di-
chotomy. But even after that decision, the analytical methodology is essentially 
a search for the existence or absence of trade-related rights and duties, which is 
fundamentally an "on-off" proposition. The analytical approach to justifying 
a measure designed to protect health or the environment, as demonstrated in 
the tuna-dolphin and turtle-shrimp disputes, further exposes this fundamental 
dynamic. The first step in the treatment of such a dispute involves a determi-
nation of a violation of GATT!WTO rights, followed by an attempt by the party 
maintaining the measure to justify the violation by reference to the enumerated 
exceptions. 
Legal Approaches Potentially More Receptive to Unilateral Measures 
In an attempt to devise a more nuanced approach, one might attempt to de-
lineate somewhat more refined categories of unilateral measures, which may 
take a variety of forms, including import prohibitions or regulatory standards. 
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One author has proposed a matrix of appropriate forms of unilateral measures 
based on the location of the environmental injuries that a party is seeking to 
avert, their severity, and the connection to multilaterally agreed measures, such 
as those contained in the Whaling Convention. 18 
Thus, to determine the legitimacy of a particular trade-related action, one 
might locate it somewhere on a spectrum. One end of the continuum would be 
an immediate, severe adverse impact occurring within the territory of the state 
of import, as from tuna contaminated with mercury. It is reasonably clear that 
regulations restricting importation of products causing such effects would sur-
vive scrutiny under GA TT/WTO rules. At the other end would be an arguably mild 
effect felt strictly within the territory of another state. An example of this va-
riety might be tree-harvesting practices that incrementally reduce the remain-
ing tropical forest resources in a foreign country, such as Brazil or Indonesia. 
An import ban on unsustainably harvested tropical hardwoods would then be 
considered presumptively infirm. Other examples might be measures designed 
to protect the welfare of animals, including endangered or threatened species, 
located exclusively within the jurisdiction of foreign states. Not coincidentally, 
as demonstrated by the juxtaposition of these two examples, the universe of 
unilateral trade-related measures cleaves fairly neatly into permissible import 
restrictions based on the content of a product and prohibited standards based 
on PPMS. 19 
Notwithstanding the potential attraction of the neat distinction provided by 
the concept of PPMS, which appears to be reasonably firmly entrenched as cur-
rent GATT/WTO law, certain situations involving trade-related measures based 
on extrajurisdictional manufacturing processes might nevertheless be good 
candidates for special treatment. One attribute that might factor into the analy-
sis is the relationship between the harm to be averted and the measure applied. 
Thus, a ban on shrimp caught in a manner that harms endangered sea turtles 
might be more likely to be considered valid than import restrictions on an un-
related product, such as terrestrially grown agricultural products. 
Cases of transboundary pollution, in which externalities from a production 
process in a foreign state have an adverse impact in the state of import in the 
form of the transmission of a physical agent from the state of export into the 
state of import, might also be thought to be particularly compelling. For in-
stance, the factory manufacturing the goods in question may be located at or 
near the border between the two countries. In such situations, of which there 
are likely to be relatively few, the relationship between the product in question 
and the direct impact in the state of import might be thought sufficient to justify 
regulation based on otherwise impermissible PPMS. 
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Measures designed to protect resources of the global commons such as the 
high seas or Antarctica, by definition beyond the geographic jurisdiction of 
any state, might also call for a special approach. Other global resources, such 
as the stratospheric ozone layer or the global climate, which have indetermi-
nate geographic extent but affect all humankind, might be treated similarly. 
The principled reason for allowing somewhat more deference to, or tolerance 
of, trade-related measures in such situations presumably is the lack of infras-
tructure for governing common resources, which consequently are at greater 
risk of degradation as a result of environmental externalities-the "tragedy of 
the commons." 
Legal constructs can also be employed to classify trade-related measures im-
posed by national governments in reliance on international-typically multi-
lateral-agreements. A national measure related to the goals of a multilateral 
agreement, although not necessarily authorized by that instrument, might have 
a higher "legitimacy quotient" than a "pure" or "naked" unilateral measure un-
related to a multilateral undertaking. This was the situation in Japan Whaling, in 
which the threatened action by the United States was intended to reinforce the 
goals of the Whaling Convention although Japan was under no international 
obligation to abide by the 1wc quota on sperm whales. In such situations, uni-
lateral measures might be treated as "gap fillers," designed to reinforce through 
concrete means a multilaterally accepted goal. 
Among parties that have voluntarily and expressly adhered to a multilateral 
agreement that specifically authorizes particular trade measures, the agreement 
operates as a legal matter as an express derogation of GATT/WTO rights even 
if those actions otherwise might run afoul of the international trade regime. 20 
Such an analysis would apply to major multilateral conventions directly regulat-
ing international trade in endangered species21 and transnational shipments of 
hazardous wastes 22 as well as to an important multilateral agreement designed 
to protect the stratospheric ozone layer that employs potentially discrimina-
tory trade measures as part of an overall strategy to enhance the efficacy of that 
instrument. 23 
The situation becomes more complicated in the case of nonparties to the 
agreement in question: such nonparties cannot be said to have consensually 
waived their GATT/WTO rights, as have parties. Analytically speaking, this situ-
ation might be nonetheless somewhat or even significantly more likely to sur-
vive scrutiny by reference to the international trade regime, because multilat-
eral measures are more likely than unilateral trade restrictions to be "necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health" or "relating to the conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources" and less likely to present situations of 
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"unjustifiable" or "arbitrary" discrimination, by the nature of their multilateral 
origin. Similarly, unilateral measures of the sort embodied by the Pelly Amend-
ment encountered in the Japan Whaling case, which are related to the purpose 
of an international agreement but not expressly authorized by it, might be seen 
as having a greater claim to legitimacy than a pure unilateral action of the sort 
encountered in the tuna-dolphin disputes. 
Policy Attributes of Unilateral Trade-Based Measures 
To date, legal analyses of the sort set out in the previous section have been the 
dominant framework for discussing the unilateral deployment of trade-based 
measures to protect the environment outside a state's jurisdiction. There are, 
however, real risks that a legalistic treatment may fail to reveal or affirmatively 
obscure more fundamental attributes of this conflict. 
For one, an international legal assessment of necessity assumes that states, as 
the near-exclusive subjects of international law, are the sole entities with a stake 
in the outcome. In reality, a highly diverse range of nonstate actors and private 
parties has an interest in these controversies. In the tuna-dolphin dispute, in 
addition to the governments of the United States and Mexico, the interests of 
domestic tuna boat operations, foreign tuna fishing interests, and domestic and 
foreign environmental and animal welfare groups ( often known as nongovern-
mental organizations [NGos]) are also affected. 
Second, the legal focus on states of necessity assumes an examination of the 
rights and obligations of states. Again, those legal constructs may only poorly 
accommodate the interests of all the nonstate actors. Moreover, as demon-
strated particularly trenchantly by recent trade negotiations such as the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in GATT, which concluded in the 
mid-199os and which established the wTo, the rights and obligations contained 
in modern-day trade agreements are often negotiated solutions to generic trade 
disputes. As such, they may have little if any integrity as fundamental, principled 
solutions to the global challenges facing the world today. 
Third, the crucial distinction between product content and PPMs-and the 
results in the tuna-dolphin-turtle-shrimp line of cases more generally-have 
been fashioned by GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels with little if any 
textual basis in the agreements themselves. Further, the procedures governing 
those dispute settlement processes, the analogue in international law of courts, 
have been vigorously criticized as lacking accountability and as insufficiently 
transparent to public scrutiny. Last, and perhaps most fundamentally, a trade-
based analysis of any sort concentrates of necessity on commodities in interna-
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tional commerce. As a consequence, the inherent integrity of the resource base 
becomes a secondary consideration-if, indeed, it appears at all in the equa-
tion. In the juxtaposition of tunas and dolphins on the one hand and shrimp 
and turtles on the other, the interests of the natural environment, as represented 
concretely by the dolphins and turtles, are accommodated (if at all) only after 
trade-based demands have been fully satisfied. Set in this broader policy con-
text, unilateral trade-based measures have their strengths and weaknesses, but 
they are not necessarily the same as those identified by a purely legal analysis. 
Benefits from Unilateral Trade Measures 
It is no coincidence that much of the legal and policy debate surrounding the use 
of unilateral measures, whether restricting trade or otherwise, has centered on 
protection of marine resources. Despite the substantial encroachment of coastal 
state jurisdiction at the expense of the high seas in recent decades, many marine 
resources-both living and nonliving-and the marine environment in general 
lie beyond the jurisdiction of any state. Given the inherent nature of the ma-
rine environment, there is a high likelihood that marine resources-those lying 
both outside and within national jurisdictions-will be perceived as shared in 
the sense that a multiplicity of states express an interest in the conservation 
or utilization of these resources. "Straddling stock" fisheries, the subject of an 
important recent multilateral agreement, 24 are an example of this category. And 
states or domestic constituencies within them may express an interest even in 
those marine resources that lie strictly within the jurisdiction of other states for 
any number of reasons, including considerations of trade, competitiveness, and 
conservation. 
For these reasons, international tensions over the appropriate approach to 
the utilization and conservation of marine resources are likely only to increase 
over time. One of the first decisions by the newly constituted International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea concerns a dispute between New Zealand and Aus-
tralia on the one hand and Japan on the other, alleging that Japan had failed to 
cooperate in the conservation of southern bluefin tuna by unilaterally under-
taking experimental fishing. 25 Accordingly, unilateral measures affecting other 
states' interests, including but by no means limited to trade, are likely to con-
tinue to be deployed thanks to a number of advantages over consensus-based 
approaches and despite the tensions sometimes associated with their use. 
Rapid Response In contrast to the time and effort often required to obtain con-
sensus in international relations, the implementation of unilateral trade-based 
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measures may be a relatively prompt means of action. A rapid response implies 
a greater opportunity quickly to halt the actions contributing to the environ-
mental degradation. In addition, the use of unilateral trade-based measures may 
curb the tendency to adopt the "lowest-common-denominator" standard that 
is often correctly or incorrectly associated with multilateral negotiations. Pro-
ponents of unilateral measures may believe that the only alternative to unilater-
alism is inaction. Therefore, unilateralism is often perceived as a direct means 
of taking action to protect the international environment in the absence of mul-
tilateral cooperation. 
Precedent and Flexibility The use of a unilateral trade-based measure by a sin-
gle state may establish a positive precedent internationally for the protection 
of the environment. A single state may be capable of initiating a more flexible 
and unconventional approach to an environmental problem. The state's indi-
vidual action may serve as a valuable and cost-effective initial attempt at curtail-
ing environmental degradation. Threatening the use of a unilateral trade-based 
measure without resorting to the implementation of a trade restriction on a 
unilateral basis may be a particularly efficient, effective, and low-cost method 
of initiating action. In addition, other states may have the benefit of observing 
the effort's effectiveness without contributing significant resources. Unilateral 
action under such circumstances may be a pragmatic response to realistic ex-
pectations with respect to states' behavior: even those multilateral efforts that 
in principle might be expected to be effective can be stymied by scofflaws, free 
riders, laggards, and holdouts. The success or failure of these independent ex-
perimental approaches may also significantly affect future policy choices. 
As discussed subsequently, unilateral trade-based actions that adversely af-
fect the interests of other states, whether or not such interests amount to legal 
rights, tend to generate pressure toward relaxation of the measure. In colloquial 
terms, one might say that unilateral trade-based measures of the sort discussed 
in this chapter have a limited shelf life. That does not mean that the impact of 
such a measure is necessarily temporary. In many instances, unilateralism may 
exert pressure on parties involved to find a more long-term bilateral or mul-
tilateral solution, which itself may have greater permanence and which might 
well not have been possible in the absence of the precursor unilateral measure. 
Unilateralism as Leadership Supporters of unilateral measures may regard 
their use as desirable or necessary for leadership at the international level. This is 
particularly relevant when the state is large and powerful and has a great deal of 
influence in the global economy. At one state's initiative, a unilateral trade-based 
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measure may contribute positively to the level of environmental protection that 
becomes globally accepted. Leadership may produce the added benefit of a race 
to the top in environmentally beneficial technology and standards. 
Unilateralism as an Incentive-Creating Device Unilateral trade measures can 
act as an intermediate way station in the development of multilateral coopera-
tion and eventually effective multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, it 
has been argued that unilateralism is a necessary precondition for multilateral-
ism. 26 Unilaterally imposed import and export restrictions as well as regulatory 
standards may represent one of the few vehicles through which to leverage a 
broader international consensus on environmental issues. Thus, unilateral ac-
tions may provide important incentives to encourage participation in multilat-
eral agreements. 
Improving the Efficacy of Multilateral Agreements Unilateral trade measures 
may be invoked as a means of strengthening the efficacy of multilateral agree-
ments and international environmental standards. As previously described, in 
the United States the Pelly Amendment allows the president to impose trade 
restrictions on any products from a foreign nation whose nationals have been 
certified by the secretary of commerce as "diminishing the effectiveness" of an 
international fishery program or "engaging in trade or taking which diminishes 
the effectiveness of any international program for endangered or threatened 
species." 27 The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment expands the Pelly Amend-
ment to allow the United States to certify a foreign nation under Pelly for al-
lowing its nationals to "engag[e] in trade or taking" that diminishes the rwc's 
effectiveness, regardless of whether the species of whale at issue is endangered. 28 
Policy Disadvantages to Unilateral Trade Measures 
As already discussed, legal objections to the deployment of unilateral trade-
based measures have been extensively cataloged in the two GATT tuna-dolphin 
panel reports, the WTO panel report on shrimp and turtles, and the Appellate 
Body decision in the same case. Policy concerns, while overlapping to some 
extent with a legal analysis, are somewhat broader still. 
Unilateralism Weakens International Order Critics may view the use of uni-
lateral trade-based measures to protect the environment as the antithesis of in-
ternational cooperation. 29 Unilateralism is often said to be inconsistent with 
multilateralism. Unilateral trade-based measures in particular may weaken the 
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effectiveness of international institutions such as the WTO and the general pro-
motion of international order and the rule of law. Unilateralism is generally a 
policy tool available only to large and powerful states at the expense of weaker 
nations. As a result, it may rarely serve smaller countries' economic or environ-
mental interests. 
International Trade and Foreign Policy Tension The use of unilateral trade-
based measures may contribute to trade tension and to the potential for trade 
disagreements between states. Unilateralism may undermine the cooperative 
and reciprocal nature of the international trading regime with potentially cor-
rosive long-range effects. In an extreme case, one might well ask whether there 
can be an effective multilateral trading system if most countries act unilaterally. 
Unilateral action often meets with retaliation from trading partners and has 
the potential to force other nations to adopt standards and objectives that may 
not be appropriate to their circumstances in the context of international en-
vironmental relations. Malaysia's threat to boycott importation of all Austrian 
products in response to Austria's mandatory ecolabeling program on tropical 
timber is a recent example of trade-based retaliation to a unilateral measure. 
In addition, unilateralism may promote a patchwork quilt of differing stan-
dards and import restrictions. Proponents of free trade typically fear undermin-
ing a liberalized international trading system by imposing unilateral standards 
on foreign societies, potentially resulting in a multiplicity of overlapping or even 
contradictory trade-based restrictions. Others suggest that unilateral measures 
are inherently unstable over the long term. In other words, any positive envi-
ronmental effect of unilateral action in the short term will be quickly dissipated 
by the ongoing instability in international relations left behind in the wake of 
such unilateral measures. 
Finally, unilateralism to promote one "desirable" social objective tends to 
justify unilateralism to promote many other social goals, each of which has 
its proponents with equally plausible arguments. The more extensive the use 
of unilateral trade-based measures, which may well be inevitable after starting 
down this slippery slope, the less effective unilateral measures become in ad-
vancing any of their declared objectives and the greater the disruption of the 
open trade system. 
Lack of Efficacy Unilateralism is a blunt tool with which to achieve environ-
mental protection objectives. Unilateral action may not be effective and may 
have minimal impact on solving the problem against which the action is being 
deployed. Critics of unilateral trade restrictions argue that they will have min-
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imal impact unless market forces are particularly amenable to the use of such 
restrictions. For example, import prohibitions on products that cause environ-
mental damage may not be effective if the nation imposing the trade measure 
is a relatively small consumer of the product or if the export market for the 
product is negligible. 
In addition, large consuming nations that institute import bans on one par-
ticular product may unintentionally cause environmentally damaging shifts in 
natural resource use in exporting countries by altering demand patterns forcer-
tain goods. For example, import prohibitions on tropical timber products may 
encourage slash-and-burn clearing of forests to provide land for agricultural 
purposes. 
In the name of the environment, domestic protectionist interests may exploit 
the use of unilateral trade-based measures, a principal concern of advocates of 
free trade. The end result may be instability in trade relations and few tangible 
benefits for the global environment. Accordingly, unilateral trade-based mea-
sures might well be seen at best as a less desirable alternative to multilateral 
cooperation. 
Unfavorable Distribution of Costs Although there is no necessary reason why 
this must be so, in practice unilateral trade-based measures of the sort discussed 
in this chapter tend to shift costs toward those less able to bear the burden 
of compliance. As a practical matter, the countries imposing unilateral mea-
sures tend to be wealthy industrialized countries, and the targets of such mea-
sures more often than not are developing countries, frequently with resource-
dependent economies pursuing a strategy of export-led growth. Embargoes of 
the tuna-dolphin or turtle-shrimp variety establish conditions for entry into 
domestic markets, and the burden of compliance is on the exporter. From a 
principled point of view grounded in welfare economics, one might justify such 
measures as implementing the polluter-pays principle and encouraging cost in-
ternalization. In practice, the near-universal effect is to shift costs to those less 
able to pay. 30 Such a result may be undesirable or unacceptable, particularly 
when juxtaposed with the policy justification for free trade on the international 
level-namely, to increase wealth, especially among less fortunate nations. 
Unilateralism versus Consensus 
Tallying the pros and cons of unilateral measures, while helpful in identifying 
their potential utility, nevertheless fails to capture the richness or intricacy of 
the dynamics surrounding such policy choices. Unilateral measures are almost 
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always understood as a second-best alternative to bilateral or multilateral coop-
eration but at the same time desirable or necessary as an interim juncture in a 
policy trajectory designed to stimulate greater international cooperation. 
A lengthy and detailed history demonstrates that unilateral trade-based mea-
sures can effectively catalyze multilateral action. Unilateral national import re-
strictions on trade in endangered species are credited with contributing to the 
development of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(crrns). 31 The conclusion of CITES in 1973 was preceded by legislation in Great 
Britain and the United States banning the importation of endangered species. 
The U.S. legislation called upon the secretary of the interior to seek an interna-
tional meeting to agree on a binding treaty regarding endangered species. 32 
The history of international efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer 
provides another example of national action serving as a prelude to multilateral 
cooperation. In 1978, the United States prohibited nonessential uses of ozone-
depleting chlorofluorocarbons, and the Nordic countries and Canada imple-
mented similar bans. The European Community also initiated a unilateral pol-
icy response by establishing a limit, significantly above then existing levels, on 
total chlorofluorocarbon production. 33 For a number of years, multilateral ef-
forts to address stratospheric ozone were focused on harmonizing these two 
disparate approaches. Although these were not successful in the period prior to 
1995, when the seasonal hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica was unexpect-
edly discovered, it is more than likely that no international action at all would 
have been taken in the absence of unilateral national measures. The Antarctic 
ozone hole was a wake-up call that encouraged both the United States-Canada-
Nordic coalition and the European Community to discuss multilateral mea-
sures that were more ambitious than either side had undertaken unilaterally to 
that time. This is a good example of "harmonizing up;' but it is worth noting 
that, at least in this case, effective concerted multilateral action was largely a 
response to the widespread perception of a new and urgent threat in the form 
of the Antarctic ozone hole. Even then, the U.S. Congress introduced legisla-
tion calling for unilateral measures in the event that international negotiations 
failed. 34 The collective example of these independent domestic measures may 
have contributed significantly to the impetus to proceed toward the negotiation 
of a stronger multilateral environmental agreement regulating trade in ozone-
depleting substances. 
In the area of transboundary shipments of hazardous waste, the 1984 U.S. 
prohibition on the export of hazardous waste without the prior informed con-
sent of the country of import 35 formed the basis for a variety of nonbinding ef-
forts in international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-
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operation and Development and the United Nations Environment Program. 36 
Those undertakings in turn preceded the principal binding multilateral instru-
ment on the topic, the Basel Convention. 37 
In certain circumstances, unilateral actions by individual parties to a mul-
tilateral environmental agreement may initiate more aggressive conduct by the 
parties as a group. For example, in an effort to halt the rapid depletion of the 
African elephant, the United States banned the importation of ivory in 1988. 38 
Shortly thereafter, several other parties to CITES followed the U.S. lead. In 1989, 
the CITES parties banned all international traffic in ivory. Similarly, the 1wc 
banned commercial whaling one year after the European Community's 1981 ban 
on the importation of whale products for commercial purposes. 39 
Recent developments in two policy areas, drift net fishing and the tuna-
dolphin problem, illustrate the ways in which policy developments may unfold. 
Italy and the Drift Net Ban 
Considerable concern has been expressed about the ecological effects of drift 
nets, defined in U.S. legislation as "a method of fishing in which a gillnet com-
posed of a panel or panels of webbing, or a series of such gillnets, with a total 
length of two and one-half kilometers or more is placed in the water and al-
lowed to drift with the currents and winds for the purpose of entangling fish in 
the webbing." 40 Drift nets have been called "walls of death" because they ensnare 
virtually everything that crosses their path, including whales, dolphins, turtles, 
and nontarget fish species. Lost or discarded nets often continue to "ghost fish" 
for years, maiming and killing additional fish and marine life. 
Concern about drift net fishing led the United States to adopt legislation 
instructing the executive branch to initiate negotiations with foreign govern-
ments to reduce the adverse impact of drift net fishing. 41 A subsequent statutory 
enactment directed the executive branch "immediately" to obtain an "interna-
tional ban" on large-scale drift net fishing. 42 The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries 
Enforcement Act of 199243 further strengthened the U.S. program by directing 
the secretary of commerce to "identify" foreign countries whose nationals or 
vessels are conducting large-scale drift net fishing on the high seas. Sanctions 
may include prohibition of fish and fish products from the offending state. At 
the same time that the United States was enacting these increasingly prescriptive 
statutory mandates, the United Nations General Assembly, after several years of 
preliminary expressions of concern and exhortations, undertook to impose a 
global moratorium on drift net fishing. 44 The United Nations recommendation 
was implemented in the European Union by regulation. 45 
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Much as in the tuna-dolphin case, a coalition of environmental and ani-
mal welfare groups successfully brought suit to compel the secretary to identify 
Italy. 46 In late July 1996, just before the mandatory imposition of an embargo 
on Italian fish products under the statute, the United States and Italy entered 
into an agreement designed to eliminate drift net fishing by Italian vessels. 47 
Among other things, Italy agreed, together with the European Union, to estab-
lish a voluntary conversion program to provide alternatives to drift net fishers, 
promised to close Sardinian ports that had been used by drift net fishing ves-
sels, and pledged to establish a more vigorous enforcement program. Based on 
the agreement, the executive branch concluded that Italy had terminated illegal 
drift net fishing and that there consequently was no longer a need to impose 
sanctions. Italy's highest court voided the port closure provision of the agree-
ment and, according to the groups that had commenced the initial litigation, 
the agreement began to "unravel." In a second lawsuit, also successful, the plain-
tiffs obtained another order directing the secretary of commerce to "identify" 
Italy. 48 The executive branch consequently is in the uncomfortable position of 
being compelled by court order to threaten sanctions after having promised not 
to do so in a prior agreement. 49 
Tuna-Dolphin and the Panama Declaration 
The drift net case study might be seen as an example of successfully keeping 
the pressure on. The opposite side of the equation is letting the pressure off, 
or identifying a situation in which unilateral measures have been either maxi-
mally or sufficiently effective to justify their removal. The fallout from the tuna 
embargo described earlier is a good example of this dilemma. 
Soon after the imposition of the tuna embargo, ten states, negotiating under 
the auspices of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, entered into an 
agreement to reduce dolphin mortality, the La Jolla Agreement. so Among other 
things, this instrument was intended to phase down the maximum permissible 
take of dolphins in the Eastern Pacific Ocean to five thousand in 1999 while 
continuing to allow the practice of dolphin sets. 
Congress rejected a proposal that would have lifted the tuna embargoes for 
parties to the La Jolla Agreement. Instead, the United States adopted new legis-
lation 51 amending the MMPA to accommodate commitments from foreign na-
tions such as Mexico to make immediate reductions in dolphin mortality, cul-
minating in a five-year moratorium on setting on dolphin beginning in March 
1994. If the foreign country were to comply fully with these undertakings, the 
tuna import ban would be lifted. Conversely, if the secretary of commerce could 
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not verify that the foreign state was fully implementing its commitments, the 
import ban would be instituted once again. Latin American tuna-exporting 
countries rejected the invitation contained in the 1992 statute, which again uti-
lized the threat of bans and nonnegotiable goals that diverged from the La Jolla 
Agreement. Nonetheless, those countries complied with the terms of the La Jolla 
Agreement, and dolphin mortality was reduced substantially. 52 
In October 1995, a configuration of states similar to those party to the La Jolla 
Agreement adopted the Declaration of Panama, 53 which anticipated binding 
international commitments with the "goal of eliminating dolphin mortality" 
but continued to acknowledge that up to five thousand dolphins per year could 
be killed. The Panama Declaration was noteworthy particularly for the schism 
it caused in the U.S. environmental community, with such groups as the En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, the National Wildlife Federation, and 
the World Wildlife Fund supporting the agreement and the Sierra Club, Friends 
of the Earth, and Defenders of Wildlife opposing it. After the adoption of the 
Panama Declaration, in 1997 the MMPA was amended yet again. 54 This time, 
in contrast to the 1992 law, the statutory amendments provided for lifting the 
tuna embargo on conclusion of the anticipated multilateral agreement, which 
was adopted in 1998. 55 
Although the 1997 legislation conformed in most of its particulars to the 
Panama Declaration, Congress declined to alter the familiar "dolphin safe" tuna 
label until the National Marine Fisheries Service, an agency of the Department 
of Commerce, conducted stress studies to demonstrate that the practice of set-
ting on dolphin does not harm dolphin populations in the long term, even in 
the absence of injuries or fatalities observed in a particular harvest. In the latest 
installment of this ongoing saga, a U.S. court has now set aside the fisheries 
service's finding of insufficient evidence of harm to dolphin stocks. 56 The result 
is that as of this writing, the tuna embargoes have not been lifted. 
These two examples demonstrate some of the real-world tensions between 
unilateralism and consensus. In other cases, one might very well expect to en-
counter trade-offs between scope and rigor, between an agreement that a wide 
variety of countries can accept and an agreement that has minimum standards 
of performance thought to be acceptable in some absolute sense. In any event, 
because unilateral measures tend to strain relations with other states, the ex-
ecutive branch may well be unenthusiastic about the use of trade embargoes 
to accomplish environmental goals, which the executive branch may well per-
ceive as of secondary or tertiary importance relative to other foreign policy ob-
jectives. It is consequently unsurprising that most of tlie examples of import 
bans have come about from the combined effect of mandatory congressional 
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enactments implemented through court orders by private conservation orga-
nizations, often over executive branch objections. 57 A similar phenomenon can 
be seen in the European Union, in which unilateral prohibitions on the im-
portation of hormone-treated beef and pelts from animals caught in leghold 
traps have generated both internal and external pressure. 58 Such situations are 
inherently unstable and invite a variety of interpretations of whether the unilat-
eral measure has accomplished its goal, outlived its utility, or become counter-
productive. 
Toward a New Paradigm 
One approach to identifying the appropriate use of unilateral trade-related 
measures might be compromises or trade-offs to achieve a welfare-optimizing 
equilibrium between the two public policy goals of trade and environment, 
both of which are intended to enhance human well-being. There is, however, 
no a priori reason to believe that a split-the-difference approach will necessarily 
reach a larger truth. The task is much more ambitious than merely delimiting a 
line of demarcation around the international trade regime by reconciling con-
flicts with environmental values through an accommodation between the two 
fields. More fundamentally, a perspective that treats this area merely as a clash 
of regimes may very well overlook the deeper dynamics that originally gave rise 
to this conflict. 
Sustainable Trade 
An alternative approach might avoid asking the question of whether interna-
tional trade is consistent with environmental protection, or vice versa. Instead, 
one might consider the role of both international trade and environmental pro-
tection as embedded in the larger public policy goal of encouraging sustainable 
development. Sustainable development was the central theme of the United Na-
tions Conference on Environment and Development, the "Earth Summit;' held 
in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and attended by more than one hundred heads 
of state and government, as well as the report of the earlier World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development, a group of twenty-one eminent indi-
viduals appointed in their personal capacities that was chaired by Norwegian 
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. Defined as "development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs;' 59 sustainable development as a concept is somewhat 
indeterminate. If anything is clear, it is that the term is plainly intended as an 
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overarching construct that encompasses international trade and environmen-
tal protection as well as other compartmentalized public policy goals such as 
development assistance. 
From this point of view, one might well ask whether certain environmental 
protection measures are so inappropriately burdensome that they unreasonably 
interfere with present generations' capacity to meet their needs. Similarly, one 
might identify the notion of sustainable trade as trade that facilitates present 
generations' efforts to satisfy their needs while preserving future generations' 
capacity to meet their needs. Without further elaboration, the concept of sus-
tainable trade thus defined is probably not capable of precise application as a 
legal test. It nevertheless does accommodate the relatively elementary notion 
that some types of trade can encourage sustainability, while other kinds of trade 
might undermine that goal. 
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, one of the prin-
cipal products of the Uruguay Round, refers to "optimal use of the world's re-
sources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development." 60 Despite 
this recitation, the structure of the Uruguay Round in larger form and com-
position is basically the same as GATT 1947 and other free trade agreements. 
That is, the WT0 instruments are designed to encourage deregulated markets 
by removing national measures that impede trade, first tariffs and then other 
nontariff barriers such as environmental regulations that stand in the way of 
unrestricted market access for beef and gasoline, to choose two recent examples. 
The GATT/wTo system is a regime consisting of primarily negative obligations 
in which states agree to rules through which they promise to refrain from taking 
actions, such as imposing certain tariffs, that could impede market access. For 
this reason, the international trade regime can define sustainability in only the 
most simplistic syllogism: deregulated markets promote trade, trade generates 
wealth, and wealthier countries have more resources to deploy for realizing en-
vironmental protection and other public welfare goals. Because of this inherent 
structural feature, the treatment of environmental measures framed in trade 
terms inevitably is confined to discussions oflimits to deregulation out of con-
cern for environmental and public health values. 
It may be a heresy from the point of view of trade policy, but from the 
perspective of sustainability, the GATT/wTo's one-size-fits-all deregulatory ap-
proach may not be appropriate for all trade. It is entirely reasonable to ask what 
kind of trade, on what terms, will minimize adverse environmental impacts and 
encourage environmental conservation and sustainable development. It may 
be that trade liberalization in the traditional, deregulatory sense is an appro-
priate policy response to certain situations, such as environmentally harmful 
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subsidies. In such a case, in which trade liberalization can improve environ-
mental quality by discouraging overexploitation or inefficient use of natural 
resources, environmental values and trade liberalization may pull in the same 
direction. 
At the same time, it is by no means apparent that a deregulated or unreg-
ulated market is sustainable for all manner of international trade. Then, such 
international agreements as those governing trade in hazardous wastes and en-
dangered species, described earlier, are most certainly trade agreements and ar-
guably sustainable trade agreements, although they are clearly not free trade 
agreements as that term is ordinarily used. Through this lens, the treatment 
of multilateral environmental agreements becomes much simpler: these agree-
ments presumably were motivated by a recognition that unrestricted trade in 
these sectors is presumptively unsustainable; that trade presents unusual envi-
ronmental, public health, and trade problems; and that affirmative regulation 
of that trade is therefore required. 
Similarly, the idea of sustainable development raises the question of whether 
the international trade regime should encourage rather than merely tolerate cer-
tain forms of environmental regulation. One could imagine a variety of incen-
tives and disincentives-taxes, subsidies, border fees, standards for imports and 
exports, consumer information, foreign aid, expanded market access in return 
for improved environmental performance-crafted to encourage more envi-
ronmentally sustainable development. Such initiatives might also be a vehicle 
for addressing overconsumption in industrialized countries, a constant refrain 
voiced by representatives of developing-country governments as a precondition 
to their acceptance of additional international environmental obligations. But 
as currently structured, the international trade regime also encourages southern 
countries' overdependence on the availability of export markets in the North, 
a phenomenon that tends to dampen any serious multilateral effort to address 
this problem. Tellingly, there have been few if any serious attempts to grapple 
with these questions in a meaningful way. 
In short, deregulation, the natural end point of free trade agreements, is not 
necessarily a vehicle for promoting environmentally sustainable development. 
To the contrary, unregulated markets have generally been rejected as a mech-
anism for pursuing improvements in environmental quality. This is hardly a 
shocking proposition, as the need for regulatory interventions to respond to 
market failures has been well recognized on the international level for some 
time. For example, a 1972 recommendation of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development plainly states, 
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Environmental resources are in general limited and their use in production and 
consumption activities may lead to their deterioration. When the cost of this de-
terioration is not adequately taken into account in the price system, the market 
fails to reflect the scarcity of such resources both at the national and interna-
tional levels. Public measures are thus necessary to reduce pollution and to reach 
a better allocation of resources by ensuring that prices of goods depending on 
the quality and/or quantity of environmental resources reflect more closely their 
relative scarcity and that economic agents react accordingly. 61 
"Ensuring that prices of goods depending on the quality and/or quantity 
of environmental resources reflect more closely their relative scarcity" is the 
exhortation, contained in the polluter-pays principle, that encourages cost in-
ternalization as at least a first step toward assuring environmental quality. Cost 
internalization and the polluter-pays principle not only are entirely consistent 
with the goals ofliberalized trade but also are affirmative mechanisms to "avoid 
distortions in international trade and investment:' 62 Current GATT!wTo rules 
allow application of the polluter-pays principle and requirements for cost in-
ternalization as a domestic environmental measure but most likely do not au-
thorize the enforcement of those standards with respect to imported goods. 63 
If cost internalization ought to be a condition precedent to entry into com-
merce on the national level, the same considerations counsel the adoption of a 
similar standard for access to the international marketplace created by the WTO 
instruments and other free trade agreements. With an affirmative requirement 
for cost internalization contained in WTO instruments, the international trade 
regime could truly simultaneously promote sustainable trade and environmen-
tal protection. 
The Role of Unilateral Measures in Encouraging Sustainable Trade 
It is important not to understate the practical impediments to realizing such a 
goal as a legal regime to be administered in a rule-based system in an institu-
tional setting such as the current WTO. Well short of that goal, however, one can 
make some observations about the appropriateness of unilateral trade-based 
measures to protect the resources outside a state's jurisdiction. 
First, one might start by determining whether the situation giving rise to the 
unilateral measure is characterized by environmental ( or other) externalities, 
the costs of which have not been internalized in the goods in question. Although 
cost internalization is not necessarily the only touchstone for determining 
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whether goods in international trade have been the subject of a foreign state's 
adequate attention to environmental concerns, this measure can be applied 
relatively uniformly on the international level to a wide variety of products. 
Imprecision in methodologies for the calculation of external costs, which are 
magnified in a foreign context, especially with respect to developing countries, 
need not be an absolute impediment. Rather, cost internalization might serve 
as an aspirational benchmark in judging the extent to which the state of export 
has engaged in good-faith efforts to assure the implementation of minimum 
environmental standards consistent with the goal of sustainable trade as a sub-
category of sustainable development. 
If a product as it appears at the border does not meet this test, then unilateral 
trade-based measures ought to be considered presumptively valid as a mecha-
nism for remedying regulatory inaction on the part of the state of export. As a 
matter of principle, welfare economics counsels that the appropriate remedy is 
a duty or fee that reflects a quantitative valuation of the externalities not inter-
nalized in the price of the product. 64 As in the case of requirements for cost in-
ternalization imposed by the state of export, the appropriate standard of review 
is probably a rough test of proportionality rather than a rigid test of whether 
the measure is exactly right. So, for example, cases of relatively trivial external 
costs might be considered de minimis cases that do not justify intervention on 
the part of the state of import in the form of unilateral trade-based measures. 
Conversely, serious environmental problems that have remained untreated or 
inadequately addressed by foreign states might justify embargoes of the tuna-
dolphin and turtle-shrimp variety. 
Such an approach provides a meaningful analytical alternative to the existing 
GATT/WTO methodology, which is objectionable or inadequate in a number of 
respects. For one, the product/process distinction, which to date has tended to 
preclude inquiries of this sort, of necessity implies the absence of minimum 
international environmental standards that can be applied to imports except in 
those cases in which the product as such is contaminated or defective. Among 
other things, this situation tends to discourage countries from adopting strong 
environmental policies. Unlike a nation's inherent complement of natural re-
sources, environmental policies can be manipulated to create artificial-and 
arguably unfair-trade advantages. 
A view that is more receptive to the deployment of unilateral trade-based 
measures can be both responsive to these concerns and analytically principled. 
Cost internalization is a minimum good-practice standard that all countries 
should adopt. Those that do not do so obtain an unfair trade advantage, which, 
through application of the polluter-pays principle, can be distinguished from 
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the "inherent" comparative advantage that drives international trade. The 
polluter-pays principle's exhortation to internalize environmental costs conse-
quently elevates to the international level environmental policies that other-
wise would be purely domestic matters, which explains the principle's justifica-
tion as a mechanism "to avoid distortions in international trade." Similarly, the 
failure to adopt a minimum standard of internalization is analogous to an ex-
port subsidy-a "pollution subsidy" -that creates unfair trade advantages for 
industries in those states with environmental policies below the international 
minimum standard. 
Another advantage to this approach is that it distinguishes between situa-
tions based on their urgency and magnitude, which the GATT/WTO regime of 
rules does not. Notwithstanding substantial differences in policy and real-world 
contexts, the tuna-dolphin and turtle-shrimp cases both were treated through 
essentially identical legal analyses, first in GATT and then in the WTO. The shared 
attribute was the attempt by the state of import, the United States, to make 
production processes actionable, and in neither case were the environmental 
exceptions in GA TT held to justify the measure. 
The two situations are in fact quite different. The shrimp embargo is a species 
protection measure, designed to preserve endangered sea turtles that otherwise 
might become extinct. Because the dolphins at issue are not endangered or 
threatened, the tuna import ban, by contrast, is by and large designed to achieve 
animal welfare goals. Of the two, the imperative to protect turtles might well 
be seen as more urgent, perhaps considerably so. Assuming that is the case, 
common sense suggests that unilateral trade-based measures are more appro-
priate in the case of the turtles than the dolphins. Analytically, such a differ-
ence would be reflected in higher external costs associated with turtle mortality 
by comparison with dolphin deaths, and the departure from the international 
minimum standard of cost internalization would be greater-perhaps much 
more so-for the turtles than for the dolphins by virtue of the former's endan-
gered status. This distinction, which laypersons tend immediately to identify as 
a distinguishing feature between the two situations, is not accommodated at all 
in a GATT/WTO legal analysis, which treats both cases as involving prohibited 
attempts by the state of import to regulate production processes. 
Finally, such an approach provides a plausible end point for adequate ac-
tion by the state of export. The tuna cases emphasize the desirability or neces-
sity of negotiations between states of import imposing unilateral trade-based 
measures, which presumably have some reasonable likelihood of resulting in 
jointly agreed consensus-based solutions. The WTO Appellate Body's report in 
the turtle-shrimp case makes clear that such negotiations should precede the 
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imposition of unilateral measures. Beyond that, the GATT/wTo system has pro-
vided almost no guidance, particularly with respect to the end point of such ne-
gotiations. It is by no means clear how one would distinguish a successful nego-
tiation, in which states of export agree to take adequate measures that preclude 
the need for unilateral import restrictions, from failed attempts to reach such 
a result. This is an important question of principle that must be answered to 
provide the link between the two primary options of unilateral and consensus-
based measures. GATT and WTO panels have provided no meaningful standards 
except to say that consensus-based approaches are a preferred alternative-and 
perhaps the only alternative. 
The Appellate Body in the turtle-shrimp dispute has now left open the sub-
stantial possibility that the United States could comply with most of the require-
ments of that report while maintaining the embargo on shrimp. Consequently, 
the second-order question of the substantive adequacy of measures to which 
states of export are prepared to agree becomes crucial. By identifying not only 
a procedural test (Did negotiations occur prior to the imposition of unilateral 
measures?) but also a substantive benchmark by which to judge the adequacy 
of the outcome (Are states of export willing to implement measures that, at a 
minimum, approximately internalize external costs?), the proposal set out here 
is much more responsive to the policy demands that are likely to arise in a prac-
tical setting. 
Conclusion 
The analytical problem of unilateral trade-based measures will likely persist for 
some time. Although the GATT/wTo regime's hostility toward unilateral mea-
sures may reduce their future attractiveness, rising concern about the global 
environment will likely maintain or increase the policy pressure for the use of 
unilateral measures. A number of potentially volatile situations, including the 
drift net fishing situation with Italy and the European Union's ban on pelts from 
leghold traps, have the potential to mature into trade disputes that might be 
brought before WTO panels. And the problem is not confined strictly to the envi-
ronment. Concern about the use of child labor in the manufacture of imported 
consumer items, which has recently attracted a great deal of public attention, 
is analytically similar, if not indistinguishable, at least under the existing trade 
regime. 
GATT/wTo rules, particularly the product/process distinction, highly dis-
favor unilateral trade-based measures designed to protect resources outside a 
state's jurisdiction, in many cases to the point of precluding altogether the use 
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of such measures, at least as a legal matter. That may be GATT/WTO law, but 
it is not the view of at least some public authorities, presumably representing 
the views of significant segments of the electorate, in certain large markets such 
as the United States and the European Union. Unilateral trade-based measures 
to protect extrajurisdictional resources have certain disadvantages, which are 
greater in some contexts than others. One might say that the GATT!WTO regime 
has provided a public service in highlighting those disadvantages and discour-
aging overuse of this policy tool by putting legal arguments in the hands of 
exporting states to enable them to negotiate more effectively in the shadow of 
the law. In other words, by increasing the leverage of exporting states through 
adjudications of legal rights, the GATT/wTo regime puts a thumb on the scale 
in a way that tends to reduce the likelihood of unilateral trade-based measures. 
At the same time, the GATT/wTo system of rules provides no answer whatso-
ever about how the international system might realize some of the advantages 
of unilateral measures constructively and judiciously deployed and thereby cre-
ate a receptive climate for ambitious multilateral undertakings with respect to 
the environment. The root of the problem is the international trade regime's 
near-exclusive focus on negative obligations, which are capable of identifying 
governmental interventions in the marketplace that are proscribed but totally 
fail to address those interventions that are necessary or required. The weakness 
of the GATT/wTo regime is the absence of minimum standards of performance 
on social policy issues such as labor and environment, such that the failure to 
meet such minimum standards would be actionable under the regime. Viewing 
trade relations, along with other interactions among states, through the lens 
of sustainability is an alternative approach that tends to recognize not only the 
drawbacks but also the advantages associated with unilateral trade-based mea-
sures designed to protect resources outside a state's jurisdiction. If we ask not 
whether trade is free but whether it is sustainable, we may begin to develop a 
more nuanced and balanced view of unilateral action. 
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